







The need for narrative in clinical education 
Abstract 
This article aims to discuss the need for clinical education to embrace the use of narrative. It 
discusses the split – most evident in Anglophone countries – between the arts and the sciences, 
before discussing what can and cannot be known from the scientific method, and what can and 
cannot be known from narrative approaches. It concludes that narrative is the natural way to teach 
and learn and has the advantage that it can explore hypothetical situations in safety as well as both 
to learn and to convey values and attitudes while the hypothetico-deductive method can say what 
does happen but can shed no light on what should happen.  
Introduction 
Eva (2014) reminds us how Lasagna’s (1964) revision of the Hippocratic Oath tells us that ‘there 
is art to medicine as well as science, and that warmth, sympathy, and understanding may 
outweigh the surgeon’s knife or the chemist’s drug.’ (Lasagna, 1964: p11) In the course of this 
article, we consider how science and the arts were once wedded, before splitting in a manner 
which, most evidently in Anglophone countries, rendered them almost as strangers to each other. 
We move on to discuss in detail the need for narrative in clinical education and how this can be 
beneficial to teachers, learners, and patients and their relatives by permitting an exploration of 
‘emplotment’ and hence hypothetical situations with full cognisance of all the actors and the 
impact of the scenario upon each and this in all its diverse manifestations. 
Science and the arts 
For a Renaissance scientist, there could never be any question of a division between the arts and 
the emergent sciences. Whether da Vinci, Harvey, Paracelsus or any of their contemporaries, the 








patrons meant that they had not only to be scientific in the sense of their explorations but also 
artists both in the sense of the graphic depiction of their work and in the verbal descriptions. An 
outstanding example of such versatility is Girolamo Cardano, physician by trade, but who 
produced in the course of the 16th century highly influential texts on ‘medicine, astrology, natural 
philosophy, mathematics, and morals … [and on] devices for raising sunken ships and stopping 
chimneys from smoking’ (Grafton, 2002: pxii) and whose Book of my Life (Cardano, 2002) gives 
an insight into how minds such as his worked. 
It is in some senses ironical that the scientific descendants of these Renaissance minds 
might well find them somewhat unnecessarily verbose, elaborate and even obscure. The 
Renaissance man, and to a large extent woman, lived the ideal of the generalist who could 
reliably move in and out of diverse circles and engage in meaningful discussion across the full 
range of human experience and contemporary knowledge. 
Even as late as the Long Eighteenth Century could we find such eminent figures as Dr Samuel 
Johnson – a doctor of letters and not medicine as physicians had not yet gained a pre-eminence 
over the title (Hamilton, 1981; Strathern, 2005) – whose 1773 edition of his dictionary (first 
published in 1755) had an entry for the word science which he pointed out was derived from the 
Latin word scientia meaning knowledge (Johnson, 1773/1828). He then lists the meanings of the 
word science in his times as follows (Lyons, 2001). 
1. Knowledge 
2. Certainty grounded on demonstration 
3. Art attained by precepts, built on principles. 








5. One of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetorick, logick, arithmetick, musick, geometry, 
astronomy 
These liberal arts were close to the Medieval Trivium and Quadrivium which every aspiring 
Medieval physician who attended university [although most did not] would have studied prior to 
undertaking his [and almost never her] medical studies in a higher faculty. That the medical student 
would be Master of Arts prior to studying medicine was no coincidence as the Trivium and 
Quadrivium were deemed essential for the proper understanding of any learning in a higher faculty, 
whether this be Medicine, Law or Theology. The Arts were the gateway to further study and only 
by demonstrating a basis in them could be aspiring university-trained physician proceed further 
(Matheson, 1999). 
It is notable that Dr Johnson includes both what we would now recognise as science and 
the liberal arts under the same heading. The split came much later with the term scientists coined 
in 1834 in contrast to artists as students of the material world (Whewell, 1834) and by 1977, the 
fourth edition of the Penguin Dictionary of Science has only physics, biophysics, astronomy, 
chemistry, biochemistry, molecular biology, and mathematics and computing listed under science. 
The split was underlined quite dramatically in the first examinations for the Indian Civil 
Service (ICS) in 1858 whose Part One examined the ‘subjects of a general education’ (Compton, 
1968: p267), but sought quite openly to recruit ‘top Oxford or Cambridge honours graduates’ 
(p267), and hence focussed on Latin and Greek as taught in those universities. The result, 
unsurprisingly, was the domination of Oxbridge graduates among those who passed and the 
nearly total exclusion of graduates from Scotland’s five universities for whom the split between 








more functional than the models of parsing beloved in the two [out of then four] English 
universities (Bell and Grant, 1977). 
Despite this, as Midgeley (2009) reminds us, ‘ 
Blake and Coleridge could discuss scientific problems with Faraday and Davy, 
… Darwin could write about Kant very sensibly … [and] TH Huxley wrote a 
book on Hume (Midgely, 2009: p27).  
Nonetheless, the stance taken by the ICS showed that the trend was moving away from the 
polymath. 
While Scotland continued its love of generalism, with school pupils intending for 
university being prepared across a range of both science and arts subjects, in England [and hence 
in the British Empire at large] early specialisation became the norm and eventually children as 
young as 14 were able to effectively drop virtually all sciences [or virtually all arts] and to funnel 
their studies until, without having yet left school, they were left with three, or exceptionally four, 
subjects which would only very rarely cross the arts/science divide.  
The situation in England was made worse by a rapid growth in anti-intellectualism, as 
demonstrated in Hughes [1877] Tom Brown’s Schooldays where the eponymous Tom states that  
I want to be A1 at cricket and football, and all the other games, and to make my 
hands keep my head against any fellow, lout or gentleman … I want to carry 
away just as much Latin and Greek as will take me through Oxford respectably 
(Hughes, 1857/1963: p282). 
As science moved from being a pursuit primarily of gentlemen of leisure [as were Lord 








developed and became a major driving force for the British Empire, an ethic developed and 
thrived that opposed to anything that resembled physical labour (Gikandi, 1996). Latin and 
Greek were effectively useless in themselves and hence respectable for this very reason, while 
engineering and science had use but demanded, or at least implied, physical labour, however 
refined, and were thus to be disparaged as worthy only of the lower orders. Science and 
engineering were directly related to jobs; Latin and Greek were not. To make matters worse, 
science and engineering resembled jobs that one might prepare for by means of an apprenticeship 
and, in reality, were [and remain] subjects favoured at university by students from working class 
backgrounds. Even the massive growth of engineering in the UK during and after the Industrial 
Revolution could do nothing to change the Weltanschauung of the ruling classes. Even the 
accomplishments of engineers as great as Brunel were powerless in the face of this thinly veiled 
class discrimination. 
Thus, we never see in UK history any phenomenon comparable to the prestigious 
Grandes Ecoles such as Napoleon established in France to train in the first instance civil 
engineers [as in case of the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées]. 
The Second World War, otherwise a uniting force across many domains of UK society, 
exacerbated the division between the arts and the sciences with a shroud of mystery, necessary 
no doubt for the war effort, surrounding the ‘boffins’ and ‘backroom boys’ [i.e. scientists and 
engineers] upon whom the nation’s hopes were pinned but who were depicted as not only 
inevitably male and balding but also as totally incomprehensible to the general public, a situation 
aided by some of the less accessible public information films which assumed a level of 
nutritional knowledge well beyond that of even a well-educated public. It was thus in parody of 








radio [and later television], found fame and fortune by literally talking incomprehensible 
gibberish. For example:  
Now, like all real life experience stories, this also begins once a polly tito, and 
Happiness Stan, whose life evolved the ephemeral colour dreamy most, and his deep 
joy in this being the multicolour of the moon. Oh yes. His home a victoriana 
charibold, the four-wheel folloped ft-ft-ft out the back. Now, as eve on his deep 
approach, his eye on the moon. Alltime sometime deept joy of a full moon scintyladen 
dangly in the heavenly bode. But now only half! So, gathering all behind him the 
hintermost, he ploddy-ploddy forward into the deep complicadent fundermold of the 
forry to sort this one out. 1. 
Against this backdrop CP Snow delivered his 1959 Rede Lecture on the two cultures which are 
the arts and the sciences. 
The two cultures 
Snow pointed out that the sciences and the humanities come from different cultures and even 
reflected differing social classes with the greatest scientists often being of working class origin; 
and particularly so for those working in the applied sciences such as engineering (Snow, 1959). 
What he voiced was the reality in UK society and ‘a special instance of the lack of scientific 
literacy in society’ as a whole (Grayling, 2009: p27). 
Snow’s lecture drew attention to these two cultures, and it was really for those trained in 
the humanities to take the sciences more seriously. He argued that, for example, the Second Law 
                                                 








of Thermodynamics should be a cultural icon along with the works of Shakespeare (Midgely, 
2009) in response to which Flanders and Swann rose to the challenge and, in First and Second 
Law, did a song2 celebrating the Second Law in a manner which was both entertaining and 
scientifically accurate.  
Heat is work and work's a curse  
And all the heat in the Universe  
Is gonna cooool down ’cos it can't increase  
Then there'll be no more work and there'll be perfect peace  
Really?  
Yeah – that’s entropy, man! 
At the time of Two Cultures lecture, school selection according to some measure of ability at age 
11 via the 11+ Examination [12 in Scotland via the Qualifier] was almost universal across the 
United Kingdom and, at least as far as those destined to be the rulers of the future, the pinnacle of 
achievement was to graduate in the Classics from Oxford or Cambridge as it was from this group 
that much of government and especially the higher echelons of the Civil Service were drawn (Bell 
and Grant, 1977). 
The same two cultures argument as employed by Snow can be applied to the cultures in 
and around clinical education where there is, for example, an uncomfortable juxtaposition of the 
scientific, where the patient and his/her condition are ‘objectified’ and one might even say 
dehumanised – though this may be the only way not to be paralysed by empathy with a sufferer’s 
pain – and the narrative, where the patient and their condition are a story, replete with characters, 
drama, suspense and some sort of hoped for – or feared – and then actual, dénouement. In the 
                                                 








narrative, it is feelings and perceptions that come to the fore. The patient and their condition are 
central, but they are there as actors within the drama, subjective and potentially irrational but key 
to the proceedings. 
The problem is one of how to introduce such narrative into medicine and a possible door 
is through increasing the understanding of the role that the arts in general and literature in particular 
can play in increasing the clinician’s understanding of what the patient is really going through and 
hence why they make the decisions that they do. 
Evans (2003) argues that incorporation of literature into clinical education supports four 
‘goods’: 
1. An education (as opposed to training) 
2. Ethics and communication skills 
3. The development of personal values 
4. A sense of wonder at embodied human nature 
Unfortunately, Evans fails to make the case that the humanities are essential for any of these 
activities. There seems to be the recognition that it is in some way good for a clinician to know 
something of the humanities, but it is not clear what this should be.  
Part of the problem surrounds the idea of truth as embodied in the arts and in the sciences. 
Both cultures aim to understand the ‘truth’ but do so by different means. The question is whether 








The scientific approach 
The basis of the scientific method is ‘objectivity’ which is often defined as things being true 
independently of the observer. However, a moment's reflection shows that this cannot be the case. 
If no human has ever observed something, then no human can know about it. The statement should 
read ‘independent of the choice of observer’, in itself a rather tall order and more of an ideal than 
an everyday reality. 
Coupled with objectivity, there is empiricism. The empirical approach grounds all 
knowledge in sensory experiences (Hume, 1777/1977). The problem which philosophers have 
wrestled with through the ages is to discern the basis upon which this might be justified. Descartes, 
in his Mediations (Descartes, 1637/2007), put the sceptic’s case that senses could not be relied on 
due to two problems. The first was the problem of illusions and the second is how to distinguish 
dream from reality. 
The justification for this grounding is ultimately pragmatic. The argument runs that if an 
animal's senses gave unreliable evidence about the real world, such as interpreting the presence of 
a lion as a rather unusual daffodil, then that animal would be, in Darwin's terms, less ‘fit’. In fact, 
people generally have such confidence in their senses that scientists usually publish without 
checking that others see the same image down the microscope.  
The issue with illusions is interesting. Illusions are detected on the basis of triangulation, 
when two different lines of evidence give rise to two different conclusions. Again, we tend to know 
when our senses are most and when least reliable. One often quoted example is the issue of colour 
constancy which breaks down under extreme conditions of lighting or which falter under the 
weaknesses of human colour perception – an example of which pertains to one of the present 









very dark blue when compared to a garment which was indeed black. An example of the 
breakdown of colour constancy occurs when red surface is illuminated by red light and so will 
appear white [or grey if the frequencies do not quite match]. Colour appearances are at their most 
reliable when viewed with sunlight at mid-day with a clear sky, conditions that most closely 
resemble the conditions under which our vision evolved, and very much unreliable when seen 
under the limited frequencies available with fluorescent tube lights. As Hume (1777/1977) himself 
pointed out, sensory data must, on occasion, be interpreted rationally. 
This idea leads to the notion of an ‘objectivity’ defined as when the same opinion is offered, 
independent of the choice of observer. This works well [though not infallibly so] when it comes to 
primary sense data but could, in principle, be applied to any question.  
Opinions on the colour of a flower will usually be accepted as objective, but not on such 
issues as who should be the next prime minister. Clearly, the opinion on the latter would be highly 
dependent upon the choice of the ‘observer’ and we can predict which opinions are those that can 
be considered ‘objective’ and which are not. Thus, the term is usually reserved to primary sense 
data and the hallmark of such is that the system has no memory although this is not quite true, as 
one can have ‘after-images’ but they are transient and fade. However, to return to the visual system, 
the perception of the colour red is not affected by what colours have been previously seen, even 
though vision itself is entirely subjective and potentially individual to the viewer. By contrast, 
one's opinion of a politician can be permanently affected by preceding events such as the Iraq war 
or Brexit. 
The hypothetico-deductive model and the sciences 
The scientific method is often equated to the hypothetico-deductive process. This process is a key 









is that it solves the logical basis of universal statements and of induction. The issue has always 
been as to how one can take the step from ‘all the swans that I have seen are white’ to the universal 
statement ‘all swans are white’. The straight answer is that one cannot (unless whiteness is part of 
the definition itself of a swan). The hypothetico-deductive method makes the observations that one 
can never prove a universal statement and never disprove a singular statement (Popper, 1959). No 
matter how many white swans one has seen, this does not prove that all swans are white. 
Conversely, one cannot prove that a black swan does not exist simply on the basis that you have 
not seen one as you cannot prove that you have inspected all swans. The scientific method works 
by postulating what may not occur and these are termed scientific laws. One then tries to disprove 
this by looking for forbidden events. The dichotomy in science is not true/false but consistent/false. 
Scientific laws are not in themselves provable, but they are consistent and open to being falsified. 
However, these laws, such as the Law of Conservation of Energy, do not explain what is 
actually occurring. Rather, they predict what will be observed, given appropriate conditions. 
Good science is based on determining mechanism. Mechanism can never be directly proved 
and is only inferred or ‘constructed’ on the basis of the following reasoning. What one observes is 
events and if one wishes to prove that events A and B are linked then one needs to demonstrate 
four things: 
1. If A then B. 
2. If not B, then not A 
3. Cause A to happen and B happens 
4. Prevent B happening and A does not happen. 
These principles surface in many guises and under different names within sciences such as Koch's 









The limitations of the scientific method 
The four steps that are required to demonstrate causality put severe constraints on the sort of events 
that can be investigated. In particular, they must be frequent, reversible or at least reproducible. 
The scientific method cannot be applied to rare and irreversible events which are just the conditions 
that apply to many of the most interesting events which involve humans such as 9/11 or World 
War II. 
Humans clearly have memory and ethics alone make it unacceptable to even consider re-
creating the same conditions to see if the same events recur – even if the formidable practical 
problems could be overcome. Thus, there is a need for a different approach for this type of problem. 
Narrative and the humanities 
People have been telling stories since the dawn of time and it is one of the major ways by which 
we learn. Great literature has two key features: plot and characterisation (Booker, 2004). The first 
feature of a good story is ‘emplotment’ whereby a string of events are connected (Ricoeur, 1981). 
Heidegger postulated that narratives serve a ‘presencing’ function (Heidegger, 1971: p44) whereby 
events past or future, real or imaginary are ‘presenced’. It is easy to see how mirror neurones 
(Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006) could be hypothesized to be a neural substrate for such a process. 
Emplotment can be equated to mechanisms and so represent the potential for deep learning. 
Schank argues that knowledge consists of stories and what we recall are plots (Schank, 1990) 
though a good storyteller reinvents the details to make the story ‘come alive’ or presenced’. These 
stories come from five sources: 
1. Official 
2. Invented (adapted) 










5. Culturally common 
These stories result in the formation of what Schank calls ‘scripts’; i.e. a set of expectations of 
what will happen in well-defined situations, and the aim of storytelling is to change other people's 
behaviour. In addition to script formation, the other key issue is indexing to allow recall of 
appropriate stories at the appropriate time. Indexing is done on the basis of facts or features in the 
story. 
In his view, intelligence then is the number and complexity of these scripts and of the 
indexing. This makes the hallmarks of intelligence to be observation and association and leads to 
the question of what are the features that lead to association. 
Narratives are how we learn and communicate. We live in social groups and it is a great 
advantage if an individual can understand what another is thinking. The mere concept that another 
individual has a mind as well as ourselves is called ‘Theory of mind’ (de Waal, 2006) and it is 
postulated, and the evidence is being gathered, that this works by imagining how we would feel if 
we were in somebody else's shoes. This leads to the other hallmark of great literature – good 
characterisation, which allows the reader to feel as the character feels, think as they think and even 
act – in their mind – as they act. This is why literature and poetry are sometimes described as moral 
activities (Eagleton, 2007). 
It should be noted what narrative cannot do. While it can be used to speculate, it cannot 
prove mechanisms. Attempts to use narrative or discourse in this way has (a) formed the basis of 
the post-modernist approach, (b) has been highly influential and (c) is mostly of extremely poor 
quality (Gross and Levitt, 1998; Sokal and Bricmont, 1998) and is not a suitable alternative to the 









have two distinct meanings. One is acquiring information from a teacher and narrative is good for 
‘passing it on’. However, it does need to be distinguished from the other which is discovering and 
from situations when a scientist discovers information from the real world. Here, narrative fails 
(Sokal and Bricmont, 1998). 
Narrative medicine 
Within medicine, there is increasing recognition of the importance of the narrative approach 
(Charon, 2006). In the 20th century, the scientific approach resulted in doctors treating patients 
increasingly like experimental subjects, culminating in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Scandal, 
whereby 600 syphilis sufferers were denied treatment to see the natural history of the disease (this 
study also had distinct racial overtones as all the subjects were of African-American descent) 
(Heller, 1972). Such objectification, under the name of science, by concentrating on the frequent 
and the reproducible, ignores the unique and the personal.  
In contrast, narrative medicine gives insight into how individual patients make sense of 
their life and that by listening to them that one conveys respect and that, in itself, can carry 
therapeutic benefit.  
This approach requires ‘close reading’ and this is a skill that requires development as well 
as the ability to listen. It also requires personal insight on the part of the clinician and an awareness 
not only of how s/he thinks but also of how patients may perceive them and their profession 
(Groopman, 2007). 
The second issue is that the sciences can shed light on what does happen but not on what 
should happen [to equate these two is termed ‘the naturalistic fallacy]. Accordingly, one would 









and all the while distinguish between the two (Jones, 1999). This exploration of hypotheticals and 
alternatives is what leads to the notion that good literature and poetry can be defined as being 
moral (Eagleton, 2007) meaning that it can affect behaviour. Miller puts it more strongly ‘Without 
story telling there is no theory of ethics. Narrative examples, stories ... are indispensable to thinking 
about ethics’ (Miller, 1987: p3). Narratives also show how far people will go in search of truth or 
results. They add the human aspect to human endeavour and maintain the human aspect in human 
suffering. 
Narrative and education 
A popular paradigm for learning is experiential learning theory (ELT) as proposed by Kolb (A 
Kolb and Kolb, 2005) along with the learning style inventory (DA Kolb, 1976) and the umpteen 
variations on this theme. Kolb’s theory proposes that learning is a four-stage process that occurs 
in sequence of concrete experience (CE), reflective observation (RO), abstract conceptualisation 










Figure 1: The Kolb Learning Cycle 
 
These stages are highly reminiscent of the hypothetico-deductive model of the scientific process 
of experiment, observation, hypothesis and prediction with a one-to-one mapping between the two 
models. This suggests that Kolb fell for a variant of the psychological fallacy that how we should 
think is how we do think! A systematic review of learning styles was highly critical of the whole 
field and in particular labelled the idea of the learning cycle as ‘may be seriously flawed’ (Coffield 
et al., 2004: p14). Even more suspect are attempts to map stages of the cycle to parts of the brain 
(Zull, 2002). 
By contrast, Klein, in his research on how people make decisions (naturalistic decision 
making), found stories to be the best way to access this information and that stories were the 









Hastie showed that jurors made sense of legal evidence by assembling it into stories so as to 
generate understanding and to facilitate recall. They also showed that the first story that the jurors 
constructed carried the greatest influence (Pennington and Hastie, 1993). Their findings are 
intuitively plausible. It is well known that we are all instinctively distrustful of a story that changes. 
It leads to the conclusion, in teaching, that getting the story right first time is of particular 
importance and this places a particular demand on the teacher that they have the necessary subject 
knowledge. 
Conclusion 
The hypothetico-deductive method has proved supremely triumphal for the acquisition of 
knowledge and the Kolb learning cycle is one example of the attempt to import the same method 
into education. However, this method was only fully understood until the 20th Century and is 
certainly not the natural method by which humans have acquired higher knowledge. Although we 
all start to acquire knowledge by interaction with the world – a process called play – this is a time-
consuming method and, as soon as we can begin to use language, play is largely supplanted by the 
narrative approach, even when that leads to play! 
The narrative is the natural way to teach and learn. It has the further advantage in that the 
narrative can explore hypothetical situations in safety and is a particularly useful way both to learn 
and to convey values and attitudes over ethical issues. The hypothetico-deductive method can say 
what does happen but can shed no light on what should happen.  
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